PhD research

Development of cryptographic methods and algorithms for electronic voting systems

PhD in Information Systems and Processes (since 2024), Department of Cybersecurity, Azerbaijan Technical University

01

Thesis

An election needs two things at once: every ballot stays secret, and anyone can check that the tally is right. Most practical e-voting schemes get this from factoring or discrete logarithms, which a large quantum computer would break.

My PhD develops cryptographic methods for electronic voting built on lattices: homomorphic tallying, commitments with zero-knowledge proofs, threshold tallying shared by several election authorities, and concrete parameters that can be checked and deployed.

  • Post-quantum e-voting
  • Lattice-based commitments
  • Threshold cryptography
  • Homomorphic tallying
  • Verifiability
  • Concrete parameters
02

Latest preprint

Cryptology ePrint Archive · 2026/2500

Threshold Post-Quantum E-Voting from Lattice Commitments

T-EVOLVE is a threshold version of the lattice-based e-voting protocol EVOLVE. Votes are Shamir-shared over the commitment message space, so any t of n election authorities can finish the tally: privacy holds against t − 1 colluding authorities, and the tally stays verifiable even if all of them collude.

Complaints between authorities, including about ciphertexts that do not decrypt, can be checked by anyone. The paper proves privacy, verifiability, individual verifiability and robustness, and comes with a C implementation.

t of nauthorities finish the tally
109 KByes/no ballot, 4 authorities
≈ 3 minto aggregate 10⁴ ballots on one core

How T-EVOLVE works, step by step

An interactive walk-through of the protocol: a ballot is committed and shared, authorities check it, and any t of them reconstruct the tally.

Coming soon
03

Papers on the thesis topic

All publications →
[2]

Threshold Post-Quantum E-Voting from Lattice CommitmentsPreprint

J. Alizadeh

Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2026/2500, 2026

[1]

Comparative Analysis of Paillier and BFV Cryptosystems for Building an Electronic Voting System

J. Alizadeh, A. Huseynli

International Journal on Information Technologies and Security, 18(2), 83–94, 2026

04

Code

Research code: not constant-time and not audited. Do not use it to run elections.